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Highlights 
 
- Convergence of financial markets is evaluated with respect to efficiency and risk. 
- Commercial, savings, and cooperative banks across 12 Eurozone countries from 1999-
2012 build the sample. 
-Two measures of efficiency (DEA and SFA) and two measure of risk (E/TA and Z-
score) are considered. 
- Eurozone financial markets converge mainly for commercial banks but to a much lesser 
degree for savings and cooperative banks. 
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Eﬃciency and Risk Convergence of
Eurozone Financial Markets
Abstract
This paper discusses beta and sigma convergence of commercial, savings, and cooperative banks in
the Eurozone from 1999 to 2012. For this purpose, concepts of the growth and eﬃciency conver-
gence literature are consulted and GMM, fixed eﬀects models, and OLS are applied. Convergence
is analyzed by calculating two eﬃciency metrics – data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA) – and two risk metrics – equity to total assets (E/TA or EQTOAS) and
Z-scores (ZSCORN). For commercial banks, eﬃciency convergence of both metrics is found, how-
ever, savings banks show no signs of convergence and cooperative banks only show signs of SFA
convergence. Banks of all three specializations show E/TA convergence, but only savings banks
convergence with respect to Z-scores. Nevertheless, the EU’s Single Market Program still has a long
way to go to create identical conditions for all member countries’ financial markets. The discovery
that there are considerable diﬀerences between banks’ specializations, and even more, that there is
convergence with respect to E/TA as a risk metric are among the main academic contributions of
this paper.
Keywords: Bank eﬃciency, Financial risk, Convergence, DEA, SFA, Eurozone
2014 MSC: 14-10, 15-01
1. Introduction
A key driver of the construction of the EU was the hope to unleash the potential of a common
market with respect to goods and services, as well as the introduction of a common currency. With
the creation of the EMU in 1999, the euro was widely expected to become a catalyst for economic
integration and convergence within Europe, not to mention a key driver of economic prosperity.5
In order to secure the functioning of the common market, economic and social cohesion became
fundamental and has been a goal of the EU from the early beginnings. The Treaty on the Functioning
of the EU already defines economic, social and territorial cohesion in the form of reducing disparities
Preprint submitted to Research in International Business and Finance April 30, 2015
Page 3 of 30
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
in development as one of the main operational priorities.1 The EU commission’s publication of the
Commission Communication on Cohesion Policy and the Environment in 1995 can be seen as a first10
major milestone that led to the creation of the European Cohesion Policy.2
The sovereign debt crisis and, more generally, the diﬀerential macroeconomic performance across
euro area members in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 recession has called into question the positive
impact of the creation of a monetary union and the existence of a common economic growth
development. Some commentators argued that the adoption of a common currency may have been15
a factor of divergence and, in particular, a source of a growing gap between a “virtuous core” and
a “sinful periphery” (Estrada et al., 2013). The years of crisis have moreover underlined that the
financial market should not only be viewed as a driver of growth but also a potentially destabilizing
risk factor due to the interconnected structure of modern financial markets.3
The aim of this paper is therefore to check whether harmonization and integration among20
Eurozone countries’ financial markets has taken place with respect to eﬃciency and risk. It was
not until June 29, 2012 that the Euro-area leaders “aﬃrm that it is imperative to break the vicious
link between banks and sovereigns” and called for a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) under
the direction of the ECB.4 However, the SSM only directly supervises the largest and systemically
relevant banks and the great majority of especially savings and cooperative banks remain under25
supervision of national authorities. The question under scrutiny therefore is to analyze to what
degree the banking market is integrated on a Eurozone level since the creation of the monetary
1The TFEU also known as the Treaty of Rome (1958) is one of two principal treaties on which the EU is based
with the other being the Treaty on European Union, or Maastricht Treaty, that became eﬀective in 1993, as outlined
in Part 3, Union policies and internal actions, of the TFEU deals with economic, social and territorial cohesion.
Further, the treaties are enhanced with 37 protocols, 2 annexes and 65 declarations that are to elaborate the details,
some are directed at specific countries, without being in the full legal text, of which Protocol 28 deals with economic,
social and territorial cohesion.
2The identified key targets are to promote growth-enhancing conditions and reduce disparities between the levels of
development of EU regions and member states in order to achieve cohesion. The objective of the European Cohesion
Policy is defined in Articles 2 and 4 and Title XVII of the Treaty establishing the European Community. According
to Article 2, Cohesion Policy should “promote economic and social progress as well as a high level of employment,
and achieve balanced and sustainable development”. Article 158 adds, “in particular, the Community aims to reduce
the disparities between the levels of development of the diﬀerent regions and the backwardness of the least favored
regions or islands, including rural areas”.
3Unlike prior crises, contagion following the 2008 global financial crisis is not confined to emerging markets.
The U.S. as well as other mature financial markets as is the case for the Eurozone, transmit and receive contagion
(Luchtenberg & Vu, 2015). Other studies conclude that contagion form the U.S. is uni-directional with respect to
spot and future equity markets (Inci et al., 2011). Apart form the internationalization of equity markets, firms are
nowadays also increasingly depended on market liquidity of debt (Mac an Bhaird, 2013).
4Source: Euro Area Summit Statement, Brussels, June 29, 2012.
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union.
Tests of beta and sigma convergence of financial and economic variables are conducted for 12
Eurozone countries from 1999 till 2012. Convergence rates are calculated by applying the generalized30
method of moments approach (GMM), a fixed eﬀects model (FE), and an ordinary least square
model (OLS) for commercial, savings, and cooperative banks. Briefly, convergence is assumed if
the estimated beta is significant and negative, and at the same time, the estimated sigma – which
is an indication of how fast the convergence takes place – is also significant. The application of
diﬀerent models allows for a general robustness check of the results. All the data is further split35
into a period before and after the onset of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008, the pre- and
post- crisis shock period, which allow for a comparison of the development of convergence.
This paper’s analysis of convergence of the Eurozone’s financial market contributes to the existing
research in several ways: Although previous studies were dealing with convergence of eﬃciency of
commercial banks in the EU, none has focused on checking for convergence in the Eurozone as a40
subset of the EU. Some studies presented inconclusive results as to whether convergence has taken
place; moreover, the countries under scrutiny were generally EU15, E22 or some other random mix
of European countries, whereas the following research exclusively deals with Eurozone countries to
assess the progress of the Single Banking Market. Due to the higher degree of economic, regulatory
and supervisory integration of the Eurozone countries compared the EU countries, convergence is45
of particular interest. Asynchronous shock have posed a severe risk for the cohesion of the euro
area, partially as Eurozone member countries were unable to mitigate weak economic growth by
the means of currency devaluation.
Although the application of convergence to bank eﬃciency data of commercial banks in the EU
is nothing new, no previous study has included savings and cooperative banks on an international50
scale. Unlike the case of commercial banks for which some studies found proof of a common banking
market, the existing literature has rarely included savings and commercial banks, despite the fact
that banks of these specializations account for roughly 30% of the total assets of the Eurozone
banking market.5 The last study employing non-parametric eﬃciency measurement and tests of
convergence was undertaken by Andrieş & Căpraru (2012b) for commercial banks of EU countries55
5Status: end of 2012 figures. Commercial banks account for approx. 50% of total assets of the banking market
and represent the largest homogeneous sub-population of banks. Source: BvD Bankscope, author’s calculations.
3
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from 2003 to 2009.6 The present research includes data from the inception of the euro in 1999 until
2012, thereby including the years of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Valuable information is
expected from results spanning over these years of financial upheaval and ensuing regulatory and
economic harmonization. Moreover, the samples are divided into two sub-periods: 1999-2006, the
years following the inception of the common currency and 2007-2012, marking the period before60
the onset of the US subprime crisis and the years of crisis, first marked by the collapse of the
US housing market and followed by the sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone. Lastly, no previous
study has dealt with the conversion of financial markets with respect to risk, which is surprising,
especially considering the large amount of literature focusing on eﬃciency and growth convergence.
New insights to the functioning of financial markets are expected by the extension of convergence65
literature.
2. Literature review
The concept of beta and sigma convergence is directly related to the neo-classical growth theory
of Solow (1956) where one key assumption is that factors of production, particularly capital, are
subject to diminishing returns. Beta convergence is defined here as a process in which poorer regions70
grow faster than richer ones and eventually both regions reach the same level. Accordingly, the
growth process should lead economies to a long-run steady-state characterized by a rate of growth
which solely depends on the exogenous rates of technological progress and the growth rate of the
working population. Diminishing returns also implies that the growth rate of poor economies should
be higher and their income and per capita GDP levels should catch up with those of rich economies.75
The ensuing seminal papers by Barro & Sala-i Martin (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992) have
triggered myriads of research papers attempting to empirically detect and measure the extent of
beta convergence in various contexts. As pointed out by Sala-I-Martin (1996), one of the striking
results obtained is the regularity of the estimated speed with which economies converge to their
steady-state, namely around 2% a year, though it is uncertain whether these suspiciously similar80
results are indeed a persistent econometric parameter or merely an artifact of cargo cult science.
6Andrieş & Căpraru (2012a) conducted a study on banking eﬃciency convergence of central and eastern European
countries. As the focus of this research paper is on the Eurozone, aforementioned study appears even less relevant
than Andrieş & Căpraru (2012b) in this context.
4
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Monfort (2008) analyzed economic convergence among EU regions using several methodologies
like the coeﬃcient of variation, the Gini coeﬃcient, the Atkinson index, the Theil index and mean
logarithmic deviation (MLD). The objective was to conduct an updated assessment of regional
disparities in the EU bringing together the most frequent instruments used in the analysis of85
convergence and inequalities. The examination of these metrics suggested that growth convergence
among EU regions is stronger than that which is indicated by summary measures of distributions.
In particular, it revealed that convergence is taking place even within groups of regions like the
EU-15.
Starting from the hypothesis that closer economic integration between countries may lead to90
increased real income per capita convergence, Borsi & Metiu (2013) investigated convergence in real
incomes between the 27 current member states of the EU for the period 1970-2010 by employing an
empirical, non-linear latent factor framework convergence test derived from a neoclassical growth
model augmented with endogenous technological progress which diﬀers across countries and over
time. Their results oﬀer important insights on the economic catch-up exhibited by the new EU95
members in light of the institutional changes and macroeconomic adjustment processes experienced
in recent decades. However, no overall real income per capita convergence in the EU is found in
their study. Instead, the authors discover country groups that converge to diﬀerent income levels in
the long-run: a South-East vs. North-West division of European economies by the mid-nineties is
observed.100
Since the preparation of the Single Market Program (SMP) in the 80s, financial integration in
Europe has been expected to provide gains in growth by favoring competition and eﬃciency on
financial markets.7 These gains should result from price reductions in financial services leading
to direct gains for consumers and indirect gains through the reduction of loan interest rates. It is
therefore of paramount inter st not only to assess convergence with respect to GDP growth, but105
also to analyze whether financial integration in the form of eﬃciency and risk convergence has taken
place in the EU.
7The SMP has begun to remove the market rigidities and barriers to mobility which in the mid-1980s gave
rise to persistent economic under-performance, reflected in rising unemployment and poor competitiveness. The
Communication of 1996 titled "The impact and eﬀectiveness of the single market" concluded that he SMP has
transformed the conditions under which cross-border business is carried out. Most of the principal obstacles to
integration of product, service and capital markets have been removed. The First Banking Coordination Directive
(1977), the EU White Paper (1985) and the Second Banking Coordination Directive (1988) finally led to the
establishment of the Single Market for Financial Services on January 1, 1993.
5
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Casu & Molyneux (2003) are among the first researchers to analyze convergence of banking
eﬃciency for the European banking system since the start of the SMP. The authors employ a non-
parametric DEA approach to investigate whether the productive eﬃciency of European banking110
systems has improved and converged towards a common European frontier between 1993 and 1997,
the years following the introduction of the SMP. Their results suggest that there has been a small
improvement in bank eﬃciency levels, although they find weak evidence to support the hypothesis
that bank eﬃciency has converged; most of the eﬃciency diﬀerences found across European banking
systems are due to country-specific aspects of the banking technology. The results were believed to115
reflect legacy of diﬀerent banking regulations and the managerial strategies implemented to face up
to the new challenges brought about by information technology, financial innovation and greater
competition within the European banking market.
Bos & Schmiedel (2007) apply a meta-frontier model that permits to assess the existence of a
single and integrated European banking market for commercial banks. The authors attempt to120
answer this question by analyzing if commercial banks in 15 European countries share a common
benchmark, that is, a common cost or profit frontier for the period 1993–2004. They find evidence
in favor of a single European banking market characterized by cost and profit meta-frontiers. How-
ever, compared to the meta-frontier estimations, pooled frontier estimations tend to underestimate
eﬃciency levels and correlate poorly with country-specific frontier eﬃciency ranks.125
Tortosa-Ausina (2002) examines the convergence in eﬃciency of Spanish banks following dereg-
ulation through a model of distribution dynamics and finds evidence of decreased dispersion of
eﬃciency scores at the end of the deregulation period. Murinde et al. (2004) investigate the conver-
gence of the banking systems in Europe following the launch of the Single Market Program in 1993.
They find weak evidence of convergence and only for specific financial products. Mamatzakis et al.130
(2008) analyze the convergence in cost and profit eﬃciency, estimated by means of SFA, for banks
in the 10 new European Union member states over the period 1998–2003. Their results indicate
some convergence in cost eﬃciency, but not in profit eﬃciency, across the new member states.
Weill (2009) determines whether financial integration has taken place on the EU banking markets,
by investigating the convergence in banking eﬃciency for European countries between 1994 and 2005.135
They provide evidence of cross-country diﬀerences in cost eﬃciency and an improvement in cost
eﬃciency for all EU countries and convergence tests for panel data show a process in convergence
in cost eﬃciency between EU countries. Robustness checks with alternative specifications confirm
6
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their findings. These results support the view that financial integration has taken place in the EU
banking markets from 1994 to 2005.140
Casu & Girardone (2010) evaluate the recent dynamics of bank cost eﬃciency by means of DEA.
Borrowing from the growth literature, the dynamic panel data models to the concepts of beta-
and sigma convergence is applied to assess the speed at which banking markets are integra ing.
Moreover, they employ a partial adjustment model to evaluate convergence towards best practice.
Results seem to provide supporting evidence of convergence of eﬃciency levels towards an EU145
average. Nevertheless, they find no evidence of an overall improvement of eﬃciency levels towards
best practice.
Andrieş & Căpraru (2012a) conducted a study of commercial banks for Central and Eastern
European countries from 2004 to 2010. They observe large diﬀerences in the level of cost eﬃciency
between national banking systems and notice an increase in banking eﬃciency for all banking150
systems until 2008. In 2009, however, the average scores of cost eﬃciency started to decline. They
find beta and sigma convergece in the form of a “catching up” process. The same author team,
Andrieş & Căpraru (2012b), investigate the impact of European integration process on the cost
eﬃciency of EU27 banking markets over the period 2003 to 2009. The results provide evidence of
both types of convergence, beta- and sigma-convergence, for the entire period, but ampler during155
crisis period (2008-2009) than pre-crisis period (2003-2007). These diﬀerences are attributed to a
“catching up” process during the pre-crisis period and a “lagging behind” process during the crisis
period. Overall, their findings suggest that the European integration had a positive impact on cost
eﬃciency and their convergence during the pre-crises period, but in the crises period, European
integration does not seem to have an evident impact. The crises struck EU countries’ banking160
systems diﬀerently and there were diﬀerences in aﬀecting cost eﬃciency in old member countries
versus new member countries.
3. Methodology
3.1. Modeling convergence
The theory of convergence and its applications have been widely studied in the growth literature165
during the last decade with Barro & Sala-i Martin (1991) proposing two concepts of convergence:
beta and sigma convergence which are generally applied to a panel of country-wise GDP growth
7
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data, or, in the context of this research, to eﬃciency scores. Beta convergence tests aim to regress
the mean country eﬃciency levels on the initial level; the test result is positive if the eﬃciency is
negatively correlated with the initial level, which implies that countries with low initial level have170
faster eﬃciency improvements than countries with high initial level, and hence convergence occurs.
The limits of this test for beta convergence have been pointed out by Quah (1996) in the case of
growth convergence: The first drawback is that, if countries with low initial level grow faster than
those with high initial level, a situation can arise where the former surpasses the latter, resulting
in the absence of convergence. The second drawback is that the beta convergence test provides no175
information on the evolution of the dispersion of the cross-section.
The methodology used to measure beta convergence of bank eﬃciency generally involves esti-
mating an equation in the following form:
lnEFFi,t   lnEFFi,t 1 = ↵+   lnEFFi,t 1 +
9X
i=1
Di + "i,t (1)
where EFFi,t is the mean eﬃciency of country i in year t; EFFi,t 1 is the mean eﬃciency of country
i in year t  1; Di the country dummies, "i the error term, and ↵ and   the parameters to be
estimated. Country dummies incorporate fixed eﬀects for the countries in the equation in order to
disentangle the country eﬀects. There is then beta convergence, or a catching-up process present if180
the coeﬃcient   of the initial level is significant and negative. A high coeﬃcient in relative terms
signifies a greater tendency towards convergence.
While beta convergence focuses on detecting possible catching-up or lagging behind processes,
sigma convergence indicates a reduction of disparities among countries over the years. The two
concepts are closely related. Formally, beta convergence is necessary but not suﬃcient for sigma185
convergence. Intuitively, this is either because economies can converge towards one another but
random shocks push them apart or because, in the case of conditional beta convergence, economies
can converge towards diﬀerent steady-states.
For the estimation of cross sectional dispersion, or sigma convergence, an autoregressive dis-
tributed lag model is applied through the estimation of the following equation, following the specifi-
8
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cation for panel data.
 Wi,t = ↵+  Wi,t 1 +
9X
i=1
Di + "i,t (2)
where
Wi,t = lnEFFi,t  MEFFt
 Wi,t = Wi,t  Wi,t 1, Di
and lnEFFi,t is the logarithm of the mean eﬃciency score of banks of country i in year t, MEFFtthe
mean of lnEFFi,tfor each period, country dummies, "i the error term, and ↵ and   the parameters to190
be estimated. Country dummies incorporate fixed eﬀects for countries in the equation to disentangle
the country eﬀects. There is then sigma-convergence if the coeﬃcient   of the initial level in Equation
2 is significant and negative. While beta convergence aims to investigate a possible catching-up
process, sigma convergence refers to a decrease of disparities cross the Eurozone banking systems
in time. Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 are part of a commonly accepted framework to asses beta and sigma195
convergence as it was used notably by Parikh & Shibata (2004); Fung (2006); Weill (2009); Casu
& Girardone (2010); Andrieş & Căpraru (2012b) and Andrieş & Căpraru (2012a). In the context
of this research, EFF refers to mean, per country and year, eﬃciency scores derived by DEA and
SFA. The research on eﬃciency convergence is then extended to risk and the two risk metrics E/TA
(or EQTOAS) and Z-score (ZSCORN) are averaged, per country and year, and tested in the same200
form; hence, in this case, EFF proxies risk.
3.2. Regression models
As for the methodology, generalized method of moments (GMM) is used as the tool for the
estimation of beta- and sigma convergence; fixed eﬀects model (FE) and pooled ordinary least
squared (OLS) serve as a robustness check. The GMM estimation takes into consideration the205
problem of endogeneity of explanatory variable and the risk of omitting an explanatory variable
and consequently producing biased estimation of the least squares parameter, since the omitted
variables are correlated with one of the regressors. To cope with this endogeneity problem, dynamic
panel data estimators developed by Arellano & Bond (1991) and Arellano & Bover (1995) are used
for the test of convergence.210
9
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An augmented version of the system GMM was proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991). They
used moment conditions to build up a two stage model; the first step yields independent and
homoscedastic error terms and the second uses the first step’s residuals to estimate a consistent
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, the estimation of the two-step is technically
more eﬃcient and results in better, independent and homoscedastic estimates that are consis ent215
and eﬃcient, but nevertheless less reliable.
Monte Carlo studies have shown that the two-step GMM estimator has the disadvantage of
converging to its asymptotic distribution relatively slowly. In finite samples, the asymptotic standard
errors associated with the two-step GMM estimators can be seriously biased downwards, and thus
form an unreliable estimation (Bond et al., 2001). The inference from the one-step estimator might220
be more reliable especially when the number of instruments is equal to or larger than the number
of cross-sectional units.
In the following analysis, the system estimator is used, since it assumes the initial conditions
of moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown
to perform well in simulations. Therefore Bond et al. (2001) recommend the consideration of225
system GMM estimators in empirical growth-related research in particular and in models where
endogeneity is expected. The advantage of the system GMM over FE and OLS is its feature of
combining a equations with both first-diﬀerences and levels, where the instruments used in the levels
equations are lagged first-diﬀerences of the series. These instruments are valid under restrictions
on the initial conditions; finally, the method also considers the extension of the estimators to the230
cases of temporary measurement error and endogenous regressors. In order to ensure validity of
the instruments, Bond et al. (2001) suggest to use the Sargan-Hansen tests of over-identifying
restrictions.
3.3. Data and variables
As for the eﬃciency score, two distinct methods are used: the data envelopment analysis (DEA)
and the stochastic frontier approach (SFA). The basic DEA and SFA model, the inputs and outputs,
as well as the specifications of both, are presented in detail in Appendix A and Appendix B. High
values of eﬃciency are associated with a narrow margin of a particular bank with best-practice
banks that lie on the eﬃcient frontier. The calculation of equity to total assets (E/TA or EQTOAS)
is straight forward. Higher values are synonym with less risk in the capital structure. The Z-score
10
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(ZSCORN) is defined as the ratio of the return on assets plus the capital ratio divided by the
standard deviation of the return on assets and widely used in the literature as bank risk taking
measure.
ZSCORNit =
ROAAit + CARit
 ROAit
(3)
with: ROAAit being the average return to assets, the CAR is the ratio of total equity over total235
assets, and  ROA being the standard deviation of return on assets of bank i in period t. Transcripts
i and t indicate bank and time. The Z-score combines in one single indicator the banks’ profitability,
capital ratio and return volatility. Evidently, the Z-score will increase with the banks’ profitability
and capital ratio, and decrease with increasing return volatility. Thus, from an economic viewpoint
the Z-score initially measures the probability of a bank becoming insolvent when the value of240
assets becomes lower than the value of debt. Hence, a higher Z-score implies a lower probability
of insolvency risk and vice versa. The calculations are performed on bank level basis using BvD
Bankscope data; for calculation of the standard deviation, the five-year moving average (2-1-2) is
used.
The three types of banks were selected as they account for 83% of the total number of banks and245
over 69% of all total assets as of 2012. The remaining banks like real-estate banks, governmental
banks, etc. were excluded in order to create a more homogeneous samples of banks with similar
technologies, access to resources, and production functions.
As mentioned in the introduction, the Eurozone is defined as the group of the following countries:
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and250
Portugal. Greece introduced the euro in 2001 and is therefore included in the dataset from this year
on.8 All following regressions and test will be conducted with this data for each type of specialization
of bank.
The data set used is composed of individual bank data sourced from unconsolidated statements
of banks operating in Eurozone countries, as made available through the Bankscope database of255
Bureau van Dijk. The study includes banks that follow IFRS as well as local GAAPs. This decision
8Due to consistency concerns, the following countries were excluded, although they joined the group of the
Eurozone meanwhile. The year in the parenthesis marks the year of the introduction of the euro: Cyprus(2007),
Estonia(2010), Latvia(2013), Malta(2007), Slovenia(2006), and Slovakia(2008).
11
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was warranted as IFRS was not mandatory, nor followed by the majority of cooperative and savings
banks before 2005. As the data here utilized is based on the main accounting categories and ratios,
no distortion due to a potential change in accounting principle is expected. The data has undergone
Table 1 Distribution of observations by specialization and country
Country Commercial banks Cooperative banks Savings banks Total
Austria 446 1,031 1,018 2,495
Belgium 211 21 7 239
Germany 1,150 13,502 6,818 21,470
Spain 433 588 558 1,579
Finland 83 - 14 97
France 1,040 941 334 2,315
Greece 146 9 2 157
Ireland 32 - - 32
Italy 1,176 6,671 680 8,527
Luxembourg 818 21 22 861
Netherlands 95 - 6 101
Portugal 185 12 35 232
Total 5,815 22,796 9,494 38,105
Number of bank observations over 13 years.
substantial editing in order to avoid inconsistencies, reporting errors and double counting; in detail260
the following steps were undertaken: First, observations with missing data were removed. As
opposed to similar studies, not only the “survivors” were kept, but also banks with missing data for
some years or who ceased to exist in 2012. This decision is justifiable as the eﬃciency frontier is
calculated on a yearly basis, survivor bias is not much of an issue, and, for the subsequent analysis,
yearly, country averaged scores are used. Second, only observations with positive inputs, outputs,265
and prices were kept; this step is mandated as DEA as well as SFA are only solvable for positive
values. Third, a certain minimal threshold for inputs and outputs were imposed. Fourth, the first
two years, 1999-2000, were excluded for Greece as they had not yet introduced the euro. Finally, a
test of four standard deviations from the mean was conducted and no outliers were observed. The
result is a total of 38,105 annual bank observations that have fulfill all criteria.270
Table 1 displays the combined observations grouped by country and specialization; the results
show that cooperative banks are by fare the largest group by number with 22,796 observations
(59.8%), followed by savings banks with 9,494 observations (25.9%) and commercial banks with 5,815
observations (15.3%). Commercial banks appear to be the most representative with observations
for each country, but especially for Germany and Italy, cooperative banks outnumber commercial275
12
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banks, the same holds for savings banks compared to commercial banks in Germany.9
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Figure 1 Yearly development of average eﬃciency and risk measures from 1999 to 2012 across Eurozone countries.
Figure 1 displays the development of the four matrices over time and gives an indication of
the diﬀerences between the specializations. The DEA model reviles that the average eﬃciency
is decreasing for cooperative and savings banks but a net increase is observable for commercial
banks. The SFA model shows a small increase for commercial and savings banks. Equity to total280
assets are improving from historically low levels in 1999 reflecting a general trends towards higher
capitalization; Z-scores that also take account of the fluctuating volatility are at their lowest in
2008 when Lehmen Brothers went bankrupt. Commercial banks are generally less eﬃcient and risky
compared to savings and cooperative banks.
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Figure 2 Kernel densities of average eﬃciency and risk measures from 1999 to 2012 across Eurozone countries.
9Countries such as Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands do not have observations for the specialization cooperative
banks; the countries Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal do have cooperative banks but their number remains
rather low. In the case of savings banks, only Ireland has no observations; Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands
and Portugal have a very limited number of observations, bearing in mind the date spans over 13 years.
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Figure 2 displays the kernel densities of the four variables under scrutiny for each specialization.285
The graphical analysis of eﬃciency scores confirm the on average lower eﬃciency values and the
higher capitalization of commercial banks. Moreover it can be seen that the observations cooperative
banks more concentrated around their median.
A preliminary graphical test of convergence can be found in Figure 3 where correlation between
the initial log levels of 1999 and the growth rate form 1999 - 2012 is visualized by the slop of the290
OLS regression. A negative trend shows that countries with low initial levels demonstrate higher
growth rates, which provides evidence of a catching-up process. As can be seen in Figure 3, the all
the regression lines are falling with the exception of cooperative banks in the DEA model.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Eﬃciency convergence295
In the following analysis, country-wise averaged eﬃciency scores are tested for convergence
by applying the system-GMM, the fixed eﬀect (FE) and the pooled ordinary least square (OLS)
model. System-GMM method is generally considered the best choice to check for beta and sigma
convergence, however, in order for the GMM to return valid results, the Arellano-Bond test for
AR(1) in first diﬀerences should not be higher then 10% and the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)300
and the Hansen test of over-identification are to be higher than 10% to consider the results viable;
otherwise, the results of the FE and OLS model are deemed to be superior to the system-GMM and
are analyzed.10 In this case, both FE and OLS model have to give the same results to demonstrate
existence of beta or sigma convergence. Moreover, eﬃciency convergence is assumed to be present
if both, DEA and SFA eﬃciency are confirmed. Table 2 and 3 display the results of beta and305
sigma convergence of DEA and SFA eﬃciency scores, first, for the entire period 1990–2012, second
1999–2006, third 2007–2012. The top tier shows the results of the commercial banks, middle tier of
the savings banks and the last tier of the cooperative banks.
Applying the above stated rules on the eﬃciency scores, both DEA and SFA combined, beta as
well as sigma convergence for the entire period under investigation is found in the case of commercial310
banks. As far as the sub-periods are concerned, the GMM is only valid for the period 1999-2006
10The FE allows for controlling unobserved heterogeneity when heterogeneity is constant over time and correlated
with independent variables, and inference is appropriate for countries under study. Hausman test was conducted to
choose between FE and random eﬀect;  2-statistic was significant and hence the FE was deemed appropriate.
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Figure 3 Convergence of eﬃciency and risk levels across Eurozone financial markets: Average eﬃciency and risk measures
from 1999 to 2012 A negative trend is an indication that countries with a low initial levels of eﬃciency or risk have high
corresponding growth rates, ergo converge, and vice versa. Such a trend is widely considered a first indicator of convergence.
(Compare, e.g. Casu & Girardone (2010)).
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in the SFA model; hence, for the other models, the results of the FE and OLS are decisive. Both
sub-periods show beta and sigma convergence, the absolute value of the sigma coeﬃcient is generally
higher in 2007-2012, which indicates a slightly faster speed of adjustment compared to 1999-2006.
It remains unclear, whether it was the increased competitive pressure or the change in regulation315
and supervision that lead to eﬃciency convergence of commercial banks in that time. The results
for commercial banks are moreover in line with the existing literature on the convergence of bank
eﬃciency in Europe (Weill, 2009; Casu & Girardone, 2010), though it should be pointed out that
the samples and time frames of those studies are not identical to the ones applied in this research.11
As far as savings banks are concerned, the GMM provide valid results for 1999-2012 in both320
DEA and SFA models; for the sub-periods, the results of the FE and OLS models are considered.
No sign of either beta nor sigma convergence is evident for banks of this specialization as the OLS
does not confirm the results of the FE. A lack of convergence in eﬃciency can be attributed to a
lack of a common market for these banks and that the Single Banking Market is not yet realized
for apparently nationally fragmented savings banks.325
When considering at the results of the cooperative banks, no valid GMM could be established
and the results of the FE and OLS are therefore decisive. Interestingly, the DEA and SFA lead
to diverging results. An explanation for this eﬀect could be found in the model parameters of the
two frontier models with the DEA resulting in overall eﬃciency and SFA in cost related eﬃciency.
Despite the promising results of the SFA in favor of convergence for the entire period as well as the330
two sub-periods, the null hypothesis of no eﬃciency convergence could not be rejected. Overall, the
FE in the DEA model hints in several cases of savings and cooperative banks in favor of convergence,
however, the lack of significance in either the OLS or the FE/OLS in the SFA model does not allow
for a clear statement of eﬃciency convergence confirmed by both DEA and SFA. More research
should therefore target eﬃciency convergence of Eurozone banks other than commercial banks.335
As an indication of the pretense of the newly established Single Banking Market, cooperative
banks showed signs of both beta and sigma convergence for the years 1999-2006. However, after the
onset of the crisis, the speed of adjustment remains indeterminable, which is manifested in a lack
11Maghyereh & Awartani (2012) found significant convergence, for instance, in the case of Gulf Cooperation Council
during the period 2003-2009, in which these countries underwent substantial reforms. Evidentially, reforms have a
positive influence on convergence and harmonization of banking markets’ eﬃciencies, whereas crises generally lead to
divergence of the former. The author leaves the concrete proof of this statement open to further research as it goes
beyond the scope of this research paper.
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of sigma convergence for this specialization. One possible explanation for the existence of pre-2007
convergence, but absence of post-2007 convergence can be seen in the fact that some Eurozone340
countries experienced tremendous economic hardship and even had to bail out systemically relevant
banks, whereas other countries also suﬀered form the crisis but to a much lesser degree. Also, there
is a certain diverging adjustment speed of banks in the crisis period, when some institutions were
trying to adapt to new circumstances while others were beginning to recover.
4.2. Risk convergence345
Table 4 and 5 display the results of the risk convergence analysis. Again, convergence is assumed
to take place if both beta and sigma coeﬃcients are negative and significant; moreover, the same
rules for the validity of the GMM and the FE and OLS regressions apply. The results of the
commercial banks reveal that although EQTOAS shows convergence for the periods 1999-2012 and
1999-2006, none of these could be confirmed by the Z-score analysis since the parameters beta and350
sigma were not significant. Commercial banks are the only instance where the validity criteria for
the GMM - that are AR(1) p-value below 5% and AR(1) and Hansen-Test p-value above 10% - are
fulfilled for the period 1999-2006, though the GMM confirms a lack of beta convergence for this
period.
As far as savings banks are concerned, both risk metrics, EQTOAS and ZSCORN, find con-355
vergence for the period 1999-2012; the analyses of the sub-period give, however, mixed results
with the EQTOAS favoring convergence in the years 1999-2007 and ZSCORN in 2007-2012. The
analysis of cooperative banks reveals beta and sigma convergence for the years from 2007 to 2012,
though EQTOAS displays convergence for all periods in the FE and OLS models, which could
however not be confirmed by the ZSCORN analysis. Overall, the GMM seems to perform poorly360
for the risk analysis, where it provides valid results only in one case.12 The FE and OLS of the
EQTOAS generally yield more instances of convergence than the ZSCORN. Hence, beta and sigma
convergence for risk - considering both metrics at the same time - is only evident for savings banks
during 1999-2012 and for cooperative banks during 2007-2012.
12The GMM model parameters, AR(1), AR(2), and the Hansen test statistic indicate a correct model specification
of the test for convergence of commercial banks’ Z-scores of form 1999-2006.
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Table 2 Beta and sigma convergence of DEA eﬃciency scores using GMM, FE and OLS
1999-2012 1999-2006 2007-2012
GMM FE OLS GMM FE OLS GMM FE OLS
Commercial Banks
beta -0.706*** -0.671*** -0.170*** -0.434 -0.888*** -0.148** -1.023*** -0.876*** -0.223***
(0.19) (0.09) (0.05) (0.43) (0.13) (0.06) (0.29) (0.13) (0.06)
constant -0.363** -0.352*** -0.079*** -0.236 -0.482*** -0.081** -0.480** -0.419*** -0.065*
(0.13) (0.05) (0.03) (0.26) (0.07) (0.04) (0.19) (0.07) (0.04)
AR(1) 0.05 0.07 0.51
AR(2) 0.11 0.06 0.29
Hansen-Test 0.97 0.33 0.06
R-sq between 0.03 0.04 0.40
R-sq 0.30 0.08 0.42 0.06 0.50 0.17
sigma -0.419** -0.591*** -0.119*** -0.150 -0.789*** -0.091* -0.187 -0.991*** -0.168***
(0.18) (0.08) (0.04) (0.26) (0.13) (0.05) (0.36) (0.12) (0.05)
constant -0.469* -0.667*** -0.130*** -0.173 -0.898*** -0.103* -0.180 -1.104*** -0.167***
(0.22) (0.09) (0.04) (0.30) (0.14) (0.06) (0.42) (0.14) (0.06)
AR(1) 0.06 0.07 0.06
AR(2) 0.18 0.17 0.58
Hansen-Test 0.97 0.33 0.11
R-sq between 0.03 0.04 0.40
R-sq 0.29 0.06 0.36 0.03 0.59 0.16
)GMM: beta and sigma convergence )FE+OLS: beta and sigma convergence )FE+OLS: beta and sigma convergence
Savings Banks
beta -0.072 -0.324*** -0.059* -0.179 -0.349*** 0.001 -0.060 -1.138*** -0.111*
(0.11) (0.06) (0.03) (0.19) (0.13) (0.04) (0.26) (0.09) (0.06)
constant -0.010 -0.055*** -0.011 -0.018 -0.052** 0.002 0.003 -0.207*** -0.023*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
AR(1) 0.10 0.06 0.10
AR(2) 0.25 0.89 0.15
Hansen-Test 1.00 0.87 0.26
R-sq between 0.00 0.06 0.11
R-sq 0.24 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.81 0.08
sigma 0.047 -0.340*** -0.045 -0.166 -0.309** 0.004 0.189 -1.160*** -0.080
(0.11) (0.06) (0.03) (0.24) (0.13) (0.04) (0.21) (0.10) (0.05)
constant 0.053 -0.346*** -0.044 -0.158 -0.312** 0.009 0.193 -1.180*** -0.077
(0.11) (0.06) (0.03) (0.25) (0.13) (0.04) (0.20) (0.10) (0.05)
AR(1) 0.05 0.10 0.14
AR(2) 0.93 0.96 0.52
Hansen-Test 1.00 0.74 0.28
R-sq between 0.04 0.04 0.07
R-sq 0.26 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.79 0.05
)GMM: no convergence )GMM: no convergence )FE+OLS no convergence
Cooperative Banks
beta -0.241 -0.335*** -0.025 -0.375* -0.547*** -0.053 -0.046 -0.481** 0.008
(0.21) (0.09) (0.04) (0.16) (0.12) (0.06) (0.20) (0.19) (0.05)
constant -0.081 -0.120*** -0.019 -0.119* -0.188*** -0.030 -0.024 -0.171** -0.010
(0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02)
AR(1) 0.17 0.11 0.12
AR(2) 0.04 0.08 0.82
Hansen-Test 1.00 0.69 0.29
R-sq between 0.10 0.29 0.07
R-sq 0.14 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.18 0.00
sigma -0.036 -0.243*** -0.005 -0.173 -0.403*** -0.010 0.133 -0.586*** 0.009
(0.20) (0.08) (0.03) (0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.21) (0.17) (0.05)
constant -0.045 -0.266*** -0.014 -0.185 -0.431*** -0.017 0.118 -0.636*** -0.008
(0.21) (0.08) (0.03) (0.17) (0.13) (0.05) (0.20) (0.18) (0.05)
AR(1) 0.06 0.08 0.08
AR(2) 0.05 0.18 0.45
Hansen-Test 0.99 0.57 0.15
R-sq between 0.12 0.40 0.10
R-sq 0.09 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.29 0.00
)FE+OLS no convergence )FE+OLS no convergence )FE+OLS no convergence
GMM:two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error. FE: fixed eﬀect model; OLS: ordinary least
squares.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for the first-order and second-order serial correlation in first diﬀerences. Hansen-Test: Sargan-
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions in the GMM estimators.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.
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Table 3 Beta and sigma convergence of SFA eﬃciency scores using GMM, FE and OLS
1999-2012 1999-2006 2007-2012
GMM FE OLS GMM FE OLS GMM FE OLS
Commercial Banks
beta -0.211*** -0.267*** -0.143*** -0.288** 0.019 0.018 -0.531* -0.447*** -0.327***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.28) (0.07) (0.05)
constant -0.140*** -0.183*** -0.102*** -0.203*** -0.025 -0.026 -0.323 -0.286*** -0.201***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.22) (0.05) (0.04)
AR(1) 0.02 0.06 0.26
AR(2) 0.13 0.61 0.35
Hansen-Test 0.97 0.34 0.46
R-sq between 0.00 0.00 0.34
R-sq 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.39
sigma -0.250*** -0.274*** -0.139*** -0.347* -0.005 0.011 -0.441 -0.448*** -0.326***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.17) (0.10) (0.06) (0.25) (0.07) (0.05)
constant -0.290*** -0.331*** -0.170*** -0.421* -0.026 -0.008 -0.483 -0.527*** -0.378***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.20) (0.11) (0.08) (0.31) (0.08) (0.07)
AR(1) 0.04 0.07 0.17
AR(2) 0.10 0.59 0.25
Hansen-Test 1.00 0.31 0.31
R-sq between 0.00 0.00 0.34
R-sq 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.40
)GMM: convergence )GMM: convergence )FE+OLS convergence
Savings Banks
beta -0.137 -0.688*** -0.086** -0.275* -1.501*** -0.101 0.127 -0.547*** -0.052
(0.12) (0.10) (0.04) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13) (0.06)
constant -0.055 -0.296*** -0.036 -0.092* -0.658*** -0.043 0.041 -0.240*** -0.031
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
AR(1) 0.10 0.33 0.30
AR(2) 0.20 0.16 0.48
Hansen-Test 0.99 0.85 0.62
R-sq between 0.10 0.00 0.01
R-sq 0.35 0.04 0.77 0.05 0.32 0.02
sigma -0.077 -0.654*** -0.077* -0.207* -1.481*** -0.092 0.135 -0.517*** -0.043
(0.12) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.14) (0.06) (0.17) (0.13) (0.06)
constant -0.083 -0.727*** -0.085* -0.220* -1.647*** -0.095 0.150 -0.579*** -0.050
(0.12) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.16) (0.07) (0.17) (0.15) (0.07)
AR(1) 0.08 0.27 0.28
AR(2) 0.16 0.30 0.57
Hansen-Test 0.99 0.56 0.33
R-sq between 0.08 0.00 0.02
R-sq 0.33 0.03 0.73 0.04 0.29 0.01
)GMM: no convergence )FE+OLS: no convergence )FE+OLS: no convergence
Cooperative Banks
beta -0.261*** -0.361*** -0.130*** -0.798** -0.984*** -0.239*** -0.205*** -0.833*** -0.082*
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.31) (0.16) (0.09) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05)
constant -0.129* -0.213*** -0.073* -0.454 -0.561*** -0.152** -0.076* -0.542*** -0.012
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.25) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05)
AR(1) 0.29 0.37 0.26
AR(2) 0.24 0.83 0.19
Hansen-Test 1.00 0.55 0.70
R-sq between 0.34 0.02 0.22
R-sq 0.17 0.08 0.46 0.12 0.44 0.08
sigma -0.244*** -0.352*** -0.126*** -0.799** -0.992*** -0.235*** -0.182*** -0.851*** -0.076*
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.34) (0.16) (0.09) (0.05) (0.17) (0.04)
constant -0.299*** -0.433*** -0.153** -0.962* -1.195*** -0.297** -0.185*** -1.095*** -0.062
(0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.47) (0.19) (0.11) (0.04) (0.22) (0.07)
AR(1) 0.30 0.38 0.26
AR(2) 0.26 0.99 0.19
Hansen-Test 0.99 0.55 0.54
R-sq between 0.37 0.02 0.17
R-sq 0.16 0.08 0.46 0.11 0.47 0.07
)FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: convergence
GMM:two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error. FE: fixed eﬀect model; OLS: ordinary least
squares.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for the first-order and second-order serial correlation in first diﬀerences. Hansen-Test: Sargan-
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions in the GMM estimators.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.
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Table 4 Beta and sigma convergence of equity to total assets ratios using GMM, FE and OLS
1999-2012 1999-2006 2007-2012
GMM FE OLS GMM FE OLS GMM FE OLS
Commercial Banks
beta -0.204 -0.715*** -0.239*** -0.061 -0.782*** -0.286*** -0.330 -0.997*** -0.113
(0.22) (0.08) (0.06) (0.41) (0.12) (0.07) (0.26) (0.17) (0.09)
constant 0.466 1.604*** 0.548*** 0.137 1.758*** 0.644*** 0.742 2.235*** 0.293
(0.50) (0.19) (0.12) (0.91) (0.28) (0.17) (0.60) (0.37) (0.20)
AR(1) 0.04 0.08 0.13
AR(2) 0.18 0.45 0.24
Hansen-Test 0.97 0.43 0.36
R-sq between 0.02 0.31 0.14
R-sq 0.34 0.11 0.36 0.16 0.43 0.03
sigma -0.364*** -0.572*** -0.528*** -0.207*** -0.622*** -0.578*** -1.506*** -0.792*** -0.544**
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.29) (0.23)
constant -2.981*** -4.562*** -4.223*** -1.631*** -4.984*** -4.626*** -11.439*** -6.266*** -4.479***
(0.24) (0.62) (0.58) (0.37) (0.91) (0.84) (0.90) (2.12) (1.66)
AR(1) 0.05 0.06 0.02
AR(2) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen-Test 0.94 0.29 0.04
R-sq between 0.01 0.02 0.14
R-sq 0.26 0.24 0.31 0.28 0.14 0.09
)FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: no convergence
Savings Banks
beta -0.252* -0.264*** -0.231*** -0.105 0.012 -0.140* -0.303* -1.039*** -0.280***
(0.12) (0.07) (0.04) (0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) (0.06)
constant 0.543** 0.566*** 0.503*** 0.232 0.021 0.301** 0.695** 2.170*** 0.650***
(0.22) (0.13) (0.09) (0.21) (0.25) (0.14) (0.31) (0.27) (0.13)
AR(1) 0.09 0.29 0.47
AR(2) 0.21 0.09 0.29
Hansen-Test 0.99 0.80 0.62
R-sq between 0.88 0.59 0.70
R-sq 0.15 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.63 0.31
sigma -0.424*** -0.345*** -0.266*** -0.372*** -0.462** -0.403** -0.570 -1.045*** -0.560***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.18) (0.15) (0.44) (0.09) (0.09)
constant -2.695*** -2.223*** -1.751*** -2.107*** -2.587*** -2.283*** -4.200 -7.353*** -4.116***
(0.45) (0.52) (0.44) (0.30) (0.96) (0.79) (2.88) (0.61) (0.58)
AR(1) 0.01 0.01 0.56
AR(2) 0.02 0.01 0.02
Hansen-Test 0.98 0.72 0.12
R-sq between 0.14 0.41 0.67
R-sq 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.78 0.48
)FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: no convergence )FE+OLS: convergence
Cooperative Banks
beta -0.319** -0.341*** -0.119*** -0.251 -0.181* -0.104*** -0.072 -0.925*** -0.195**
(0.14) (0.07) (0.03) (0.18) (0.10) (0.03) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
constant 0.659* 0.725*** 0.268*** 0.533 0.382* 0.224*** 0.172 1.976*** 0.448***
(0.29) (0.15) (0.07) (0.37) (0.21) (0.07) (0.25) (0.13) (0.16)
AR(1) 0.17 0.09 0.35
AR(2) 0.32 0.42 0.16
Hansen-Test 1.00 0.80 0.77
R-sq between 0.25 0.40 0.03
R-sq 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.88 0.16
sigma -0.662*** -0.593*** -0.437*** -0.701*** -0.611*** -0.463*** -1.367*** -0.846*** -0.563***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.12) (0.11) (0.25) (0.11) (0.10)
constant -4.487*** -3.991*** -2.966*** -4.723*** -4.080*** -3.103*** -9.306*** -5.827*** -3.929***
(0.37) (0.56) (0.50) (0.41) (0.82) (0.71) (1.66) (0.74) (0.70)
AR(1) 0.01 0.03 0.76
AR(2) 0.01 0.01 0.02
Hansen-Test 0.99 0.58 0.15
R-sq between 0.03 0.00 0.07
R-sq 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.25 0.66 0.44
)FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: convergence
GMM:two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error. FE: fixed eﬀect model; OLS: ordinary least
squares.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for the first-order and second-order serial correlation in first diﬀerences. Hansen-Test: Sargan-
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions in the GMM estimators.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.
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Table 5 Beta and sigma convergence of Z-scores using GMM, FE and OLS
1999-2012 1999-2006 2007-2012
GMM FE OLS GMM FE OLS GMM FE OLS
Commercial Banks
beta -0.395* -0.586*** -0.049 -0.147 -0.727*** -0.070 -0.763** -1.190*** -0.040
(0.19) (0.09) (0.04) (0.22) (0.12) (0.05) (0.28) (0.17) (0.07)
constant 0.918* 1.412*** 0.099 0.392 1.807*** 0.182 1.731* 2.761*** 0.002
(0.49) (0.21) (0.10) (0.52) (0.29) (0.13) (0.82) (0.41) (0.17)
AR(1) 0.04 0.08 0.85
AR(2) 0.36 0.30 0.05
Hansen-Test 0.93 0.52 0.04
R-sq between 0.55 0.33 0.21
R-sq 0.27 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.60 0.01
sigma -0.853*** -0.956*** -0.615*** -0.570*** -0.660*** -0.313*** -1.266*** -1.575*** -1.174***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13)
constant -9.959*** -11.157*** -7.133*** -7.006*** -8.085*** -3.948*** -13.622*** -16.940*** -12.396***
(0.74) (1.22) (1.09) (1.09) (1.35) (1.02) (0.66) (1.08) (1.51)
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.82
AR(2) 0.04 0.86 0.00
Hansen-Test 0.92 0.29 0.03
R-sq between 0.62 0.47 0.35
R-sq 0.41 0.25 0.33 0.14 0.90 0.65
)FE+OLS: no convergence )GMM: no convergence )FE+OLS: no convergence
Savings Banks
beta -0.456* -0.806*** -0.135** -0.597* -0.628*** -0.186** -0.618 -1.240*** -0.148
(0.22) (0.10) (0.06) (0.27) (0.13) (0.08) (0.37) (0.16) (0.09)
constant 1.234* 2.223*** 0.369** 1.696** 1.793*** 0.559** 1.561 3.262*** 0.323
(0.60) (0.28) (0.16) (0.73) (0.37) (0.24) (0.97) (0.42) (0.24)
AR(1) 0.09 0.32 0.51
AR(2) 0.73 0.48 0.09
Hansen-Test 0.98 0.73 0.08
R-sq between 0.42 0.02 0.01
R-sq 0.43 0.05 0.35 0.09 0.71 0.07
sigma -0.736*** -0.717*** -0.705*** -0.739*** -0.612*** -0.591*** -1.244*** -1.242*** -1.134***
(0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.02) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
constant -10.342*** -10.072*** -9.901*** -11.112*** -9.238*** -8.940*** -16.015*** -15.971*** -14.457***
(0.57) (1.64) (1.55) (0.33) (1.81) (1.71) (1.75) (1.38) (1.42)
AR(1) 0.01 0.01 0.68
AR(2) 0.06 0.01 0.00
Hansen-Test 0.98 0.73 0.06
R-sq between 0.32 0.27 0.00
R-sq 0.32 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.86 0.78
)FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: convergence )FE+OLS: no convergence
Cooperative Banks
beta -0.508* -0.654*** -0.056 -0.208 -0.605*** -0.011 -1.254*** -1.064*** -0.122*
(0.27) (0.08) (0.03) (0.21) (0.12) (0.04) (0.16) (0.15) (0.06)
constant 1.289 1.696*** 0.145 0.582 1.576*** 0.036 2.852*** 2.708*** 0.296*
(0.71) (0.22) (0.09) (0.59) (0.31) (0.12) (0.69) (0.39) (0.16)
AR(1) 0.10 0.27 0.82
AR(2) 0.48 0.48 0.09
Hansen-Test 1.00 0.85 0.38
R-sq between 0.05 0.46 0.13
R-sq 0.40 0.03 0.34 0.00 0.68 0.12
sigma -1.472*** -1.486*** -1.182*** -1.244*** -1.374*** -0.637*** -1.215*** -1.585*** -1.401***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11)
constant -19.630*** -19.563*** -15.565*** -16.115*** -17.777*** -8.300*** -15.939*** -20.767*** -18.281***
(0.60) (1.18) (1.32) (1.63) (1.72) (1.71) (1.22) (0.89) (1.52)
AR(1) 0.01 0.02 1.00
AR(2) 0.04 0.72 0.03
Hansen-Test 0.99 0.55 0.10
R-sq between 0.64 0.40 0.00
R-sq 0.75 0.59 0.69 0.29 0.96 0.84
)FE+OLS: no convergence )FE+OLS: no convergence )FE+OLS: convergence
GMM:two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error. FE: fixed eﬀect model; OLS: ordinary least
squares.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for the first-order and second-order serial correlation in first diﬀerences. Hansen-Test: Sargan-
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions in the GMM estimators.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.
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5. Conclusions365
One of the main motives for the creation of the Single Market Program (SMP) was to improve
competitiveness of the Eurozone financial markets. In addition to the SMP, great macroeconomic
impulses were expected from the introduction of the single currency, which are commonly believed
to have been realized; however, unequal economic development lead to asynchronous shocks in the
form of unemployment, labor productivity, GDP growth, but also financial shocks in form of the370
spreading of volatility via the equity market and the drying up of liquidity in the credit market.
Eﬃciency and risk metrics are considered two quantitative determinants of financial institutions’
competitiveness. In this paper, the focus is on variables related to eﬃciency – measured by DEA
and SFA – and risk – measured by equity to total assets and Z-score. Special consideration was
given to the three most prevalent types of banks with respect to total assets: commercial, savings,375
and cooperative banks.
The results show that commercial banks have been the prime beneficiaries of the SMP as can
be seen by their increased eﬃciency levels - evidenced by both DEA and SFA metrics - and lowered
risk, that is higher equity to total assets in 2012 compared to 1999. Moreover, commercial banks
appear to have also benefited from both, eﬃciency and risk convergence, which is not surprising380
since commercial banks often operate more internationally and are exposed to higher competitive
pressure than savings and cooperative banks. However, the period 2007-2012 shows no significant
risk conversion, which can be seen as a sign of asynchronous development with respect to national
capital requirement, unequal regulatory pressure to re-capitalize, but also unbalanced earnings or
increased volatility of earnings. The reason for the lack of conversion in this period may be found385
in the fact that diﬀerent Eurozone countries were hit by the Subprime crisis at diﬀerent times.
As for savings and cooperative banks, eﬃciency convergence appears largely absent, which can
be seen as a proof that there is limited pressure to operate on the same level of eﬃciency, though,
the overall eﬃciency levels of banks of both specializations are higher than the levels of commercial
banks. The pressure to operate on the same level of eﬃciency generally depends on competition and390
the threat of a takeover or increased market concentration through cost pressure. In order to remedy
this situation, policy makers are to facilitate market entry, to open the border for cross-country
expansions, and mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, the first step would involve to harmonize
supervision and regulation on EU or Eurozone level with respect to these issues for both types of
banks. Just as commercial banks, savings and cooperative banks are risk converging with respect395
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to equity to total assets, however only limited convergence is found for Z-scores. The conversion
of former would indicate that no additional capital regulation is needed to stimulate conversion of
Eurozone banks; the lack of the latter shows that there are considerable diﬀerences between savings
and cooperative banks when it comes to earnings’ volatility and the Z-score. The contradictory
development of Z-score convergence justifies a diﬀerentiated consideration of these banks in empirical400
studies; however, it is for now an important indicator that the Single Banking Market has not yet
been fully realized in the Eurozone for all types of banks.
AppendixA. Model and parameter selection for DEA model
Eﬃciency scores are calculated using an input-oriented DEA approach, which is prevalent in the
literature of banking eﬃciency. The input-oriented approach is equivalent to input-minimization.405
As banks are expected to operate in a highly competitive environment, they are assumed to be price-
takers, implying the input-minimization approach. The alternative is output maximization which
is valid for industries’ outputs are not solely determined by market forces and can be controlled
for, implying an output-maximization approach to production (Sealey & Lindley, 1977; Ferri et al.,
1999). The variable returns to scale VRS approach developed by Banker et al. (1984) is used,410
which allows for the possibility that the production technology of banks in the sample may exhibit
increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale.
If the number of observed banks is limited, an overestimation of eﬃciency estimates is possible.
This is, however, not an issue in this sample because the sample size is large enough to encompass
all banks reporting to Bankscope data base. The question of how many of inputs and outputs in the415
DEA model should also be addressed here: A DEA model with a higher number of variables will have
higher eﬃciency estimates than if less input and/or outputs are used. If more inputs and outputs
are used, eﬃciency scores are generally higher. That is why only three inputs and three outputs are
used. The inputs used consist of personnel expenses, fixed assets, and deposits; outputs consist of
loans, other earning assets, and fee income. Table A.6 displays select descriptive statistics of the420
inputs and outputs for each bank specialization as well for all specializations combined combined.
It becomes apparent that commercial banks are on average twice as big compared to savings
banks and 8 times as big compared to cooperative banks when taking total fixed assets as a proxy
for size. Even more pronounced is the size advantage of the commercial banks over the other two
specializations when comparing total deposits (approx. 14:2.7:0.8) or total fees (approx. 106:19:8.3).425
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Table A.6 Inputs and outputs used for DEA
PersEx FixedA Deposits Loans OEA Fees
Commercial mean 132.05 80.52 14077.46 8302.63 9966.60 106.37
p50 16.30 8.01 1284.10 710.60 540.70 14.90
sd 492.26 271.99 59365.47 30470.09 53100.86 386.80
min 0.10 0.01 1.50 0.20 0.90 0.07
max 7107.00 3618.00 1168000.00 585200.00 1507000.00 5985.00
Savings mean 33.46 42.13 2727.58 2041.64 1130.18 18.95
p50 16.15 18.00 1104.60 743.30 425.25 7.60
sd 76.46 128.61 7028.11 6759.34 2888.42 51.88
min 0.30 0.05 1.53 1.34 1.12 0.08
max 1996.40 3508.30 176000.00 198600.00 65567.30 1373.50
Cooperative mean 11.41 10.99 882.95 649.62 439.77 8.33
p50 4.20 4.60 224.50 172.90 89.70 1.90
sd 32.04 26.88 4438.30 2400.89 4641.27 30.26
min 0.20 0.03 7.20 0.30 0.50 0.10
max 1092.80 618.30 198000.00 94038.70 232100.00 1000.70
Total mean 35.31 29.36 3356.09 2164.33 2065.63 25.94
p50 6.70 6.60 401.10 282.10 157.40 3.40
sd 202.03 128.38 24148.08 12791.36 21366.52 158.85
min 0.10 0.01 1.50 0.20 0.50 0.07
max 7107.00 3618.00 1168000.00 585200.00 1507000.00 5985.00
PersEx, Personnel expenses; FixedA, Total fixed assets; Deposits,Deposits and short-term funding; Loans, Total loans;
OEA, Total other earning assets; Fees, Fee-based income.
p50, median; min, minimum; max, maximum; million EUR
Despite these findings, commercial banks also comprise the overall smallest banks for any input or
output. This is also reflected in the much lower median compared to the mean by roughly 10 times.
Some commercial banks are clearly among the largest and possibly stock market listed banks in the
Eurozone.
AppendixB. Model and parameter selection for SFA model430
The SFA eﬃciency score are estimated using a two output (loans and securities) three input
(wages, interest costs and other operating costs), translog cost function specification, following,
among others, Altunbas et al. (2007):
lnTC =↵0 + ⌧1t+
1
2
⌧1t
2 +
2X
i=1
(↵i + 'it) lnQi +
3X
h=1
( h + ✓ht) lnPh
+
1
2
24 2X
i=1
2X
j=1
 ij lnQilnQj +
3X
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where
• lnTC is the natural logarithm of total costs (operating and financial cost);
• lnQi the natural logarithm of bank outputs, total loans and total securties;
• lnPh the logarithm of ith input prices (i.e. wage rate, interest cost and physical capital price).
The choice of the translog form was primarily motivate by identified problems associated with the435
Fourier functional form especially when dealing with heterogenous data sets (Altunbaş et al., 2001).
The descriptive statistics for the inputs, outputs, and prices of the SFA model can be found in Table
B.7. The size advantage of the commercial banks is here as well obvious.
Table B.7 Inputs, outputs, and prices used for SFA
TC Q1 Q2 P1 P2 P3
Commercial mean 755.44 8302.63 5538.70 1.28E-05 0.0261 0.0250
p50 75.90 710.60 141.40 1.07E-05 0.0222 0.0201
sd 2896.84 30470.09 36920.75 1.29E-05 0.0196 0.0341
min 0.80 0.20 0.06 3.54E-08 0.0000 0.0002
max 50877.00 585200.00 1273165.00 2.72E-04 0.2610 1.1165
Savings mean 137.26 2041.64 678.28 1.26E-05 0.0238 0.0214
p50 58.80 743.30 314.90 1.25E-05 0.0242 0.0212
sd 350.10 6759.34 1772.77 3.33E-06 0.0076 0.0055
min 0.80 1.34 0.10 3.87E-08 0.0012 0.0001
max 11726.40 198600.00 52350.30 9.93E-05 0.0881 0.1638
Cooperative mean 46.65 649.62 244.92 1.45E-05 0.0210 0.0250
p50 13.10 172.90 57.50 1.46E-05 0.0206 0.0248
sd 212.51 2400.89 2298.01 3.73E-06 0.0072 0.0064
min 0.50 0.30 0.06 3.89E-07 0.0011 0.0008
max 10018.00 94038.70 125304.00 4.76E-05 0.0713 0.1038
Total mean 177.39 2164.33 1160.75 1.38E-05 0.0225 0.0241
p50 22.60 282.10 90.10 1.37E-05 0.0216 0.0233
sd 1183.04 12791.36 14677.14 6.10E-06 0.0104 0.0146
min 0.50 0.20 0.06 3.54E-08 0.0000 0.0001
max 50877.00 585200.00 1273165.00 2.72E-04 0.2610 1.1165
TC, total costs; Q1, total loans ; Q2 total securities; P1, wage rate; P2 interest cost; P3, physical capital price.
p50, median; min, minimum; max, maximum; million EUR
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